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EXPLAINING EXTREMITY  
IN THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES1 
To be published in International Studies Quarterly (12 journal pages) 
RYAN K. BEASLEY  
University of St Andrews 
AND  
JULIET KAARBO 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Why do multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies produce more 
extreme foreign policies than single-party cabinets? Our paper argues that 
particular institutional and psychological dynamics are responsible for 
extremity. We test this argument using a global events dataset incorporating 
foreign policy behaviors of numerous multiparty and single-party 
governments. We find that more parties and weak parliaments promote 
extremity in coalitions, but parliamentary strength has the opposite effect for 
single-party governments. This study challenges existing expectations about 
the impact of democratic institutions on foreign policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 This investigation was financially supported by the University of Kansas General Research Fund.  We 
thank Cristian Cantir for research assistance and anonymous reviewers and the ISQ editors for their 
suggestions. The data used in this project are available on ISQ’s data replication site. 
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Parliamentary democracies governed by multiparty cabinets make foreign policy 
decisions in a politically complicated context. But deadlock and meaningless 
compromise need not result. Even the image of the coalition cabinets in the French 
Fourth Republic as epitomizing instability, ineffectiveness, and deadlock is now being 
challenged.  Indeed, coalition dynamics may have promoted activism in the Fourth 
Republic’s foreign policy. As Hanreider and Auton (1980:156) argue: “…internal 
weakness pushed the Fourth Republic even more toward foreign matters.” Among 
historians “a positive view of post-war French foreign policy has become something of 
an orthodoxy” (Imlay 2009:500).   
Despite the predominant view of coalition governments as being constrained, 
they frequently make significant foreign policy decisions.  In 1993, Japan’s first 
multiparty cabinet after decades of mostly single party rule made a historic and 
controversial decision to open its domestic markets to rice imports (Kaarbo 2012).  
Turkish coalition governments joined a customs union with the EU (in 1995) and 
accepted the EU’s offer of candidacy (in 1999) – two important and historic points of 
cooperation in EU-Turkish relations (Kaarbo 2012). In 2003, Italy, Australia, and the 
Netherlands—all ruled by coalition governments—made significant contributions to 
troop levels in Iraq. (BBC News 2004).  And in 2014, coalition governments in 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom (among others) maintained troop 
commitments in Afghanistan (NATO 2014).  Indeed, recent research finds that 
coalitions engage in extreme—whether cooperative or aggressive—foreign policies 
(Kaarbo and Beasley 2008). Other research, however, fails to find any difference 
between the foreign policies of multiparty and single party cabinets. Furthermore, some 
theoretical logics suggest that coalitions generally should be more constrained and 
peaceful than single-party cabinets; others imply the opposite. 
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To address this debate, we first unpack the category of coalitions by exploring 
theoretical expectations of various institutional and psychological factors on foreign 
policy. We then use historical events data to analyze the links between cabinet 
characteristics and foreign policy behavior. We find that extremity in coalition foreign 
policy is related to the cabinet’s parliamentary strength and to the numbers of parties in 
the coalition, but in ways that are counter-intuitive to expectations from democratic 
peace research. We also find that institutional factors affect single-party cabinets 
differently that they do coalition cabinets. 
 
The Importance of Coalitions in Foreign Policy 
 Coalitions are widespread and occur in parliamentary democracies when no 
single political party controls enough seats in parliament to form a majority or when 
leaders form oversized cabinets (national unity governments or “grand” coalitions) in 
response to national crises. Historically, coalition cabinets existed in important states at 
critical times: Great Britain during the world depression of the early 1930s, Israel during 
all Arab-Israeli conflicts and peace processes, West Germany during the Cold War, and 
India when it became a nuclear power.   
 Coalition cabinets operate within a distinct institutional context where the 
authority to make foreign policy is shared among competing political parties. These 
parties frequently disagree on foreign policy. How parties resolve these disagreements is 
critical to foreign policy choices. Although disagreements are common in the executive 
branch of any democratic government, they are particularly contentious in a coalition 
cabinet. If policy disputes are not settled, the coalition may dissolve, leaving the 
government in a deadlock. The dynamics of bargaining and decision-making in coalition 
governments is therefore unique. Junior coalition partners (which may include very 
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small political parties) can have disproportionate influence, even thwarting the dominant 
party’s preference at times (Kaarbo 1996). This is especially true if the junior party 
controls the foreign or defense minister posts, as it does in the majority of current 
coalition cabinets (Kaarbo 2012).   
 
Previous Research:  Coalitions vs. Single Party Governments 
Empirical work on the links between coalition politics and the substantive nature 
of foreign policy shows mixed results. Contrary to the democratic peace logic, which 
argues that the institutional constraints of multiple actors and possible “veto players” 
make coalitions the most peaceful regime type (Maoz and Russett 1993),2 other studies 
show that coalitions formulate more aggressive foreign policy than single-party 
governments. Compared to single-party governments, coalitions engage in greater 
reciprocation in militarized disputes (Prins and Sprecher, 1999), greater likelihood of 
involvement in international disputes (Palmer, London, and Regan, 2004), and increased 
likelihood of initiating disputes leading to fatalities (Clare, 2010). However, Ireland and 
Gartner (2001), Reiter and Tillman (2002), and Clare (2010) found no difference 
between single-party and coalition cabinets in dispute initiation. Palmer, London, and 
Regan (2004) found no difference between single and multi-party cabinets in dispute 
escalation. Leblang and Chan (2003) conclude that coalition cabinets are not more likely 
than single party cabinets to be involved in war.3  Research on the impact of coalition 
governments on diversionary foreign policy also shows mixed results, as some studies 
suggest that coalitions are less likely to use diversionary force (Brulé and Williams 2009; 
                                                
2 For theoretical rationales for why coalitions might be more constrained, see Auerswald 1999; Elman 
2000; Ireland and Gartner 2001; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004.  Brulé and Williams (2009) argue a 
different logic for peaceful foreign policy in coalitions:  because coalitions enjoy diffuse accountability, 
they may be able to blame other parties for poor internal conditions, reducing their need to divert with 
aggressive foreign policy (see also Kisangani and Pickering 2011). 
3 Although they did find that electoral systems based on proportional representation, which is highly 
correlated with coalition governments, was negatively related to a country’s war involvement. 
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Kisangani and Pickering 2011), while others indicate that coalitions are more prone to 
diversionary behavior (Kisangani and Pickering 2009). 
Variations in research designs may influence these mixed results, as studies use 
different time periods and include different additional variables in their analyses. In 
particular, the type of dependent variable used in these studies may produce 
inconclusive results. Democratic peace research examines conflict-related behavior, 
including dispute initiation, escalation, and reciprocity (Prins and Sprecher 1999; Ireland 
and Gartner 2001; Reiter and Tillman 2002; Palmer et al. 2004; Clare 2010). In conflict 
situations, moreover, international factors may have more influence, governments may 
suppress internal disagreements, and the decision-making authority may become 
restricted to manage the crisis. We therefore expect that the institutional effects of 
coalition politics will be less apparent in these situations. 
Existing research also confounds institutional constraints with substantive policy 
direction.4  Arguing that coalitions are more peaceful assumes that coalition leaders 
prefer more aggressive policies but are institutionally constrained.  Similarly, arguing 
that coalitions are more aggressive assumes that junior partners favor aggressive policies 
and push the cabinet in this direction.  Neither assumption is necessarily true. Junior 
parties may favor more peaceful policies and push the cabinet in that direction, and 
peace-loving prime ministers may be just as constrained by institutional checks as war-
prone leaders. We cannot assume that coalitions are generally peaceful or generally 
aggressive in their foreign policies without knowing the preferences of the coalition 
actors.   
Kaarbo and Beasley (2008) addressed some of these limitations. Using the World 
Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) dataset, they compared a broad range of foreign policy 
                                                
4 Clare (2010) is a notable exception.  He focuses on the ideological fractionalization of the coalition.  
Palmer, London and Regan (2004) also include ideological orientation of the cabinet. 
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behaviors for single and multi-party cabinets. They examined the level of policy 
extremity (exhibiting highly aggressive or cooperative behavior, rather than moderate 
behavior) and the level of policy commitment (making verbal statements versus material 
acts). Their study found that coalitions were not more prone to conflict than single-party 
governments, but that coalitions were both more aggressive and more cooperative. In 
other words, coalitions were more extreme than single-party cabinets. The study, 
however, did not examine the specific mechanisms that produce this relative extremity. 
Building on this previous research, we attempt to uncover these mechanisms. This paper 
examines the factors that account for the extremity of coalitions’ foreign policy choices.  
 
Explaining Extremity 
There are four theoretical explanations for the extremity of coalition cabinets’ foreign 
policy choices: 1) political hijacking by junior parties within the coalition,  2) domestic 
political weakness driving diversionary foreign policy, 3) diffusion of accountability due 
to shared authority among multiple  parties, and 4) logrolling that combines and 
multiplies policy options. These four theoretical explanations come from two disciplines: 
political science and psychology. Interestingly, institutional explanations from political 
science have parallels in social psychology literature on group decision making, 
particularly in research on group polarization (see Kaarbo 2008).    
Numerous studies find that groups are more than the sum of their parts, tending 
to make more extreme or more cautious choices than their individual members prefer 
before group discussion (Brown 2000). Evidence for group polarization comes from 
studies conducted in over a dozen different countries and from a wide-range of research 
on attitudes, jury decisions, ethical decisions, judgment, person perception, and risk 
taking (Myers and Lamm 1976; Brauer and Judd 1996).  Group polarization research has 
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focused on comparing groups to individuals and has ignored institutional 
characteristics.5 A combination of institutional dynamics with psychological polarization 
processes means coalition cabinet group may be particularly vulnerable to extremity.  In 
the next section, we review these institutional explanations for extreme foreign policy, 
noting corollary social psychological mechanisms where appropriate. We unpack the 
category of coalitions and argue that different types of coalitions will behave in different 
ways.   
 
1. Hijacking  
The first explanation for coalitions’ extreme foreign policy behavior involves the 
power of junior parties in the cabinet. Moderate senior parties often have to rely on 
smaller, more ideologically extreme junior parties to maintain a majority of seats in 
parliament. As a result, senior parties become vulnerable to political “hijacking” by their 
junior partners. If the senior party cannot successfully bargain with its junior partners on 
foreign policy decisions, the latter may defect from the coalition and bring down the 
government. Junior parties are, in Tsebelis’s term, potential “veto players” in the cabinet 
(Tsebelis 1995). While they might not always get the more extreme decisions they seek, 
junior parties have been influential in key foreign policy decisions of important states, 
such as Germany, Israel, Turkey, and Japan (Hofferbert and Klingemann 1990; Kaarbo 
1996, 2012; Kaarbo and Lantis 2003).    
Many scholars assume that junior parties in a coalition are either a strong 
advocate for peace (Auerswald 1999; Rieter and Tillman, 2002; Palmer et al. 2004) or 
an agitator for conflict (e.g. Elman 2000). This assumption confounds the institutional 
position of the junior party with its policy position. Only Clare (2010) combines the 
                                                
5 Janis (1972) is one exception. 
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ideological orientation of the cabinet and the blackmail potential of critical junior 
coalition partners in his examination of foreign policy extremity. Clare adds ideological 
distance, or “fractionalization,” in his analyses, locating the distance of a left- or right-
wing outlier party from the rest of the government. His study finds that “the likelihood 
of dispute initiation increases as the government moves from a fractionalized coalition 
with a far-left outlier party toward one with a right-wing outlier party” (Clare 2010: 980-
981). Clare’s study is an important contribution to this area of research, as it decouples 
the institutional and the ideological dynamics of coalition decision-making. We believe, 
however, that the presence of junior parties affects foreign policy independently of 
political ideology. The hijacking potential that critical junior parties have should 
produce more extreme foreign policy behaviors. 
Social psychological research highlights other ways that more extreme junior 
parties can influence coalition politics. A dominant explanation centers on the “group 
polarization” phenomenon, and the use of informational persuasion: 
Group members with more radically polarized judgments and preferences 
invest more resources in attempts to exert influence and lead 
others….The more self-confident and assertive members of the group are 
very often capable of communicating expectations that eventually their 
position will prevail….These expectations may act as a powerful 
incentive for those who are undecided and are waiting for indications 
concerning which way the wind is blowing. Correctly or incorrectly, 
these members interpret assertiveness as a cue and throw in their support.  
This triggers a self-fulfilling prophecy resulting in majority support for 
the more polarized position (Vertzberger 1997: 284).  
 
A junior partner with a more extreme foreign policy position provides an opportunity for 
polarization through persuasion. Even without any blackmail power, minority junior 
parties can persuade the majority by framing the problem in terms of socially shared 
constructions (see, for example, Moscovici 1976; De Vries and De Dreu 2001; Smith, 
Tindale, and Anderson, 2001). 
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2. Domestic Political Weakness 
The second explanation of coalition cabinets’ extreme behavior involves the  
domestic conditions these governments face. The political fragmentation, vulnerability, 
and uncertainty that produce coalition governments can compel these governments to 
use foreign policies for diversionary or legitimating purposes. According to Hagan 
(1993: 30-31), an “…unstable coalition may try to act on major foreign policy issues in 
order to demonstrate its ability to cope with policy crises and thereby achieve some 
legitimacy at home….” Prins and Sprecher (1999: 275) similarly argue: “…the relatively 
higher level of domestic uncertainty that surrounds coalition cabinets may…encourage 
greater risk-taking behavior.” This logic is consistent with diversionary theories of 
conflict (Levy 1989). Brulé and Williams (2009) and Kisangani and Pickering (2009, 
2011) point to diffuse accountability in coalition governments, noting that parties may 
be able to blame others for bad domestic conditions, and may not need to fall back on 
diversionary foreign policy. On the whole, however, these studies report mixed results. 
Brulé and Williams (2009) contend, for instance, that very weak coalitions may have 
limited recourse to address domestic strife, and subsequently use aggressive foreign 
policy for diversionary reasons. 
Social psychological research offers a parallel explanation for the effects of 
domestic weakness on foreign policy extremity. According to Janis (1972), high stress 
from external threats and low self-esteem induced by recent failures creates an illusion 
of invulnerability, self-censorship, and pressure on dissenters.  These conditions can 
polarize groups when its members initially concur on an extreme position and 
groupthink reinforces this choice.  Coalition governments do not seem like plausible 
victims of groupthink, as their structure of competing political parties appears to 
promote a difference of opinions. (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993). Yet Metselaar 
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and Verbeek, in their study of Dutch foreign policymaking, argue that “…when the 
survival of the government is threatened and coalition partners estimate that the 
government’s downfall may produce serious negative electoral consequences or may 
otherwise harm party interests, they may engage in feverish consensus-seeking”  (1997: 
109).  Furthermore, the desire for cohesion may drive the group into premature 
consensus-seeking without actual agreement on its political goals. Brown (2000) 
suggests that “maybe it is only when groups are desperately seeking to manufacture 
unity that they become prey to the concurrence seeking defects that Janis identified; 
having once achieved it, the pressure for unanimity will be more than outweighed by the 
security it provides to allow criticism and dissent” (2000: 219). Coalitions desire 
unanimity to continue to govern and may seek to manufacture policy unity, even if 
excessive consensus-seeking produces much more extreme foreign policy. 
Although domestic political conditions can explain coalitions’ aggressive and 
conflictual behavior, they can also explain very cooperative foreign policy. Weaker 
coalitions—those that are more vulnerable to collapse from defections, challenges from 
the parliament, or by-elections that would further weaken them—seem more likely to 
engage in extreme behaviors.6  
The strength of the coalition can also influence the specific direction of the 
cabinet’s policies. Political leaders may believe that highly conflictual policies bolster an 
otherwise weak government, as external conflict often produces a “rally-‘round-the-flag-
effect.” The psychological dynamics of groupthink are also more typically associated 
with highly conflictual policy “fiascoes.” On the other hand, Palmer, London, and Regan 
(2004) argue that politically stronger cabinets face lower costs associated with the use of 
force. They find a significant positive relationship between the percentage of cabinet 
                                                
6  Kisangani and Pickering (2011) make a similar argument for humanitarian/benevolent vs. 
political/strategic interventions. 
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controlled parliamentary seats and the likelihood that the country is involved in a dispute 
(but found no relationship to dispute escalation). Their study, however, compared all 
cabinets (single-party and coalitions) and did not analyze whether the parliamentary 
strength of the cabinet affects coalition decision-making. We expect weaker coalition 
cabinets to use extreme (and particularly conflictual) policies for diversionary purposes. 
 
3. Diffusion of Accountability 
The third explanation for coalitions’ extreme behavior focuses on the diffuse 
accountability within these governments. It is difficult to hold multiple parties 
accountable for policy failures within a coalition. Prins and Sprecher (1999) argue that 
the inability to blame any single political actor gives coalitions more flexibility in 
foreign policy-making. They find that coalitions are more likely to reciprocate behavior 
in militarized disputes.7  Ironically, by this reasoning, the more veto-players in a 
coalition translates into a rather “constraint free” environment (Hagan 1993: 27).  
The political diffusion argument has a parallel explanation in the social 
psychological concept of group polarization, wherein “…responsibility and 
accountability for consequences is diffused among group members.  This reduces fear of 
failure, and thereby decision makers have incentives to make riskier decisions” 
(Vertzberger 1997: 281). Similarly, Vertzberger argues that “when decisions for others 
are made by a group, the tendency toward risk avoidance is less pronounced because 
failure can be shared with others so that anticipated personal responsibility would be 
reduced” (1997: 282). Thus for both psychological and political reasons, a greater 
                                                
7 Note that as it is applied to diversionary use of force, accountability approaches expect the opposite:  less 
accountable coalitions are less likely to use force since they can blame domestic problems on other parties 
(Brulé and Williams 2009; Kisangani and Pickering 2011).  In this study, we separate diffusion and 
accountability issues.  Regardless of domestic conditions, less accountable coalitions may feel more 
comfortable engaging in risky foreign policy. 
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number of parties in a cabinet can allow the government to engage in more extreme 
political behaviors. 
Coalitions in parliamentary democracies come in many sizes, and those with four 
or five parties would presumably enjoy more flexibility due to diffused accountability 
than those with only two. Clare’s 2010 study is most relevant here, as it includes the 
number of veto-players in a cabinet (those parties that are critical to maintaining a 
parliamentary majority), and found that cabinets with more parties were less likely to 
initiate disputes leading to fatalities. Clare did not find a significant relationship between 
the number of parties in a cabinet and dispute initiation. Brulé and Williams (2009) 
found that cabinets with more parties exhibited less aggressive behavior.8 
Scholars use the diffusion argument to justify the expectation that coalitions are 
more conflictual, aggressive, and pursue policies that involve more risks. We argue that 
highly cooperative policies (and policies involving a high level of commitment) are also 
risky for governments. Cabinets with more parties find it safer to pursue riskier behavior, 
as the parliament and the general public cannot easily attribute policy failures to any 
single party or actor. 
4. Logrolling  
The fourth explanation for coalitions’ extreme foreign policy also focuses on the 
number of actors within a coalition, but involves a different underlying mechanism. A 
greater number of parties in a coalition creates the potential for logrolling. Highly 
fragmented coalitions can resemble what Jack Snyder (1991) calls “cartelized systems,” 
in which narrow, parochial interests are represented in the government. In these systems, 
decision-making proceeds by “logrolling” or “paper-clipping” several preferred options 
                                                
8 Palmer, London and Regan (2004) examined whether or not there were multiple pivotal players in the 
cabinet (coded as a dichotomous variable) but not how many coalition partners, critical or otherwise, were 
present.  The results from their analyses were mixed:  the presence of multiple pivotal parties was slightly 
significantly and negatively related to dispute involvement, but not to dispute escalation.  
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together. Snyder argues that this process can lead a government into riskier decision-
making, and eventually into overexpansion. 
The logrolling explanation is very political in nature, and does not have a direct 
parallel in psychology, but some findings in comparative political economy are relevant. 
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) found that more parties in a cabinet correlate with higher 
levels of government spending. They suggest this is because “…coalitions of many 
parties will strike less efficient bargains than those composed of fewer parties. The less 
efficient bargains imply a larger public sector, other things being equal, as the number of 
parties in government increases” (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006: 251). The logrolling 
effect is, according to Blais, Kim and Foucault (2010), the “standard view” in the 
literature on public spending, although there are alternative theoretical viewpoints and 
mixed empirical findings (Sakamoto 2001). Thus the logrolling dynamic is another 
explanation of extreme decision-making. Given Snyder’s argument about government 
“overexpansion,” we expect this extreme behavior to lean more in the direction of 
conflict than cooperation. 
Summary 
From this review of four theoretical explanations for coalitions’ extreme foreign 
policy, we derive four hypotheses. We present these in Table 1, which also summarizes 
their underlying mechanisms. 
 
--TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE— 
 
Research Design 
The study assesses various theoretical explanations for extreme behavior by 
examining the characteristics of coalition governments and their effects on foreign 
policy. We then investigate some of these characteristics across single-party and 
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coalition governments. For our statistical analysis we use a subset of the World 
Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS), which McClelland (1976) developed and Tomlinson 
updated (1993). The WEIS dataset catalogues the actions of all major international 
players in “newsworthy” events from 1966 to 1991. For each event, WEIS identifies the 
actor (originator of the action), the type of action, the target of the action, and the arena 
or situational/episodic context in which the event occurred. Actions include both verbal 
acts (i.e., statements of policy support and threats) and non-verbal acts (i.e., grants of aid 
and military clashes).    
The actors selected from this dataset are the major parliamentary democracies, 
including governments not only in Western European states, but also those in North 
America, Oceania, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. For each actor in the WEIS 
dataset that was a parliamentary democracy, we consulted Woldendorp, Keman, and 
Budge’s (2000) Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998) to determine if the 
cabinet was a coalition at the time of the event. Coalitions are cabinets that formally 
contain at least two independent political parties. Minority cabinets that only include one 
party, but which relied on the support of other parties in parliament, are considered 
single-party governments. Likewise, cabinets in which all the parties have permanent 
electoral alliances are considered to be single-party cabinets. Our analyses include over 
23,000 events, from 1966 to 1989.9 The countries and the total number of events by 
cabinet type for each country are listed in Table 2.  
We include three dependent variables to examine the effects of cabinet 
characteristics on international behavior: (i) the level of cooperation/conflict in the 
                                                
9 Events that were domestic actions (‘domestic event codes’) and events that were comments that are not 
translated into the Goldstein scale (i.e. pessimistic and optimistic comments) were not included in the 
analysis.  There were seven events under one cabinet (in 1979 in India) for which the Woldendorp, Keman, 
and Budge (2000) source did not report the number of parliamentary seats controlled by cabinet and were 
excluded. Malta had only three events from one government, and was thus excluded from the analyses.  
Because of extensive missing WEIS data for 1990 and 1991, this study does not include these years in the 
analysis.   
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actor’s behavior; (ii) the extremity of the actor’s behavior; and (iii) the level of 
commitment in the actor’s behavior. The level of cooperation/conflict in the actor’s 
behavior is captured by Goldstein’s (1992) widely used conflict-cooperation scale, 
which ranges from -10 indicating the highest levels of conflict to +10 indicating the 
highest levels of cooperation. We refer to this variable throughout as 
cooperation/conflict. We also used the cooperation/conflict scale to assess the extremity 
of the actors’ behavior; the scale was folded at the midpoint by using the absolute value 
of the cooperation/conflict scale to create a new scale ranging from 0 (moderate) to 10 
(extreme). To assess the level of commitment in the actor’s behavior, we categorized 
actions as low commitment (verbal behavior) and high commitment (non-verbal 
behavior).10  We view the extremity and commitment variables as different indicators of 
high profile, riskier behaviors. Both of these variables tap the riskier nature of the 
foreign policy but do not communicate anything about its substance or particular 
direction (i.e., how cooperative or conflictual the foreign policy is).11   
-- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE -- 
The independent variables in our first set of analyses correspond to the four 
explanations of extreme coalition behavior – hijacking, weakness, diffusion, and 
logrolling (see Table 1 for specific hypotheses). To assess the potential for hijacking by 
a junior party (any coalition party that is not the largest party in the coalition), we coded 
each cabinet for the presence of a critical junior party.12 Critical junior parties are 
defined as any party in minority coalitions, and as any party with enough parliamentary 
                                                
10 The following action categories were coded as low commitment:  comment, consult, approve, promise, 
agree, request, propose, reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten.  The action categories coded 
as high commitment were:  yield, grant, reward, demonstrate, reduce relations, expel, seize, force.   See 
East (1973: 569) for a similar connection between level of commitment and verbal/nonverbal behavior.  
11 The variables commitment and extremity of behavior are correlated (Pearson r = .59, p<.01) but are not 
identical, nor are they linearly related.  Very extreme behaviors are always non-verbal in nature, and very 
moderate behaviors are always verbal in nature.  Behaviors in the mid-range of the extremity scale are 
mixed between verbal and non-verbal acts.   
12 We used Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2000) as the source used to determine if the coalition 
included a critical junior party. 
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seats in a majority coalition that its defection would mean the loss of a parliamentary 
majority for the cabinet. Consistent with the possibility of hijacking foreign policy, we 
hypothesize that the presence of a critical junior party will result in more extreme and 
more committed behaviors. Given that we do not include the substantive or ideological 
positions of the junior party, we make no prediction on the direction of extremity (i.e., 
cooperative or conflictual).   
We use two related but distinct variables to assess the proposition that the 
weakness of coalitions propels them toward extremity. First, we coded each coalition 
cabinet for its level of parliamentary support. This is simply the percentage of 
parliamentary seats controlled by all parties formally in the cabinet.13 Our second 
indicator of weakness is the majority/minority status of the coalition. For this we use a 
standard dichotomous classification: a majority coalition is comprised of parties that 
together have more than half of the total parliamentary seats (50%+1 seat). We 
hypothesize that as parliamentary support decreases, coalition behavior will become 
more extreme and more committed, since weaker coalition cabinets have more reason to 
engage in high-profile behavior. We also expect that as parliamentary support decreases, 
coalitions will engage in more conflictual behavior, since this creates a diversion from 
the government’s domestic weakness. Similarly, we hypothesize that minority coalitions 
will be more extreme and more committed in their foreign policy behaviors,  and will 
engage in more conflictual behaviors than majority coalitions.14   
We assess the third and fourth explanations (diffusion of accountability and 
logrolling) by coding the cabinets for the number of parties that are formally part of the 
                                                
13 We use Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2000) as the source to code the parliamentary strength 
variable.   
14 Looking at both coalition and single party cabinets, Brulé and Williams (2009, p.787) conclude 
“minority executives appear to have a greater propensity than majority executives to turn to the 
international arena to demonstrate their leadership competence in response to deteriorating economic 
conditions.”  Kisangani and Pickering (2011) had similar results. For a general comparison of minority 
and majority governments, see Strøm (1990). 
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coalition.15 The number of parties in the coalitions included in this analysis ranged from 
two to five.16 Because cabinets with more parties are less accountable for risky decisions 
and because more parties may engage in logrolling, we hypothesize that coalitions with 
more parties will act in more extreme and more committed ways. Because less 
accountability and logrolling have been associated with militarized action and expansion, 
we also expect that more parties will engage in more conflictual behaviors.   
We run separate linear regression models for both the cooperation/conflict and 
the extremity dependent variables. For the dichotomous dependent variable commitment, 
all analyses use logistic regression. Each model includes all three independent variables 
(number of parties, parliamentary strength, and presence of a critical junior party). 
Recognizing that other factors have clear effects on foreign policy, we include control 
variables to isolate the effect of cabinet characteristics on behavior.17 For each analysis 
of the three dependent variables, we include the actor’s power score at the time of the 
event, using the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) from the Correlates 
of War National Military Capabilities dataset (Version 3.0) (Singer, Bremer, and 
Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987). We expect that countries’ levels of cooperation/conflict, 
extremity, and commitment reflect their national government’s power, regardless of the 
characteristics of the cabinet (East 1973). 
When examining the level of conflict/cooperation in the dependent variable, we 
include an additional control variable indicating whether the target of the action was 
                                                
15 We use Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2000) as the source for the number of cabinet parties. 
16 All but one of the 2691 events for coalitions with more than five parties were for Israel, making the 
inclusion of such coalitions statistically problematic.  Thus, all analyses were restricted to countries with 
five or fewer parties.  Removing these events is a more conservative test, working against our hypotheses, 
as the six and seven party cabinets in Israel were also the most conflictual and extreme in our dataset. 
17 Many studies, particularly those looking at conflict behavior and dispute escalation, have demonstrated 
the importance of interaction and reciprocity in dyads. Although some studies using WEIS have examined 
dyads and reciprocity, these studies are limited to very few states (cf. Derouen and Sprecher 2006).  We 
do not include the effect of prior events in our analysis due to the difficulty of isolating many initiating 
events, as well as our uneven ability to do this across the countries in our study.  Examining the state-state 
dyadic interactions available in the WEIS dataset would have produced narrow analyses across a limited 
number of countries and institutional configurations. 
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democratic (all actors in the analysis are democratic). This control variable accounts for 
findings in the democratic peace literature on dyadic state behavior. We use the Polity 
IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) to code whether the target, if another state, is a 
democracy. Not all of the targets of the actions are states. All non-state actors are not 
coded for this control variable and these events are not included in the analysis of 
cooperation/conflict behavior. We code states with a democracy score of greater than 
seven as democratic. We expect that countries will be more cooperative toward the 
target if it is democratic, regardless of the characteristics of the cabinet.   
We weight the data to address the problem that particular countries dominate the 
dataset. Specifically, Israel (as the actor in over 53% of the events) and West Germany 
(as the actor in over 23% of the events) together constitute more than 76% of the data 
for coalitions. These two countries have a disproportionate influence on any un-
weighted analyses. Furthermore, Israel, with the highest percentage of events, engages 
in the most conflictual behavior of these coalition cabinets and exhibits very high levels 
of extremity and high-commitment behaviors. To address this distortion, we weight the 
cases so that all countries’ events are equal in the analysis (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008). 
We weight each country’s events to the mean number of events across countries. This 
ensures that no country is disproportionately represented in the data and the total number 
of events is preserved.18  
 
Comparing Coalitions:  Results & Discussion 
Table 3 reports the results from the regression analyses. The presence of a 
critical junior party in coalitions is significantly related to levels of cooperation/conflict, 
extremity, and commitment, although not as our hypotheses predicted. Coalitions with 
                                                
18 Controlling for the effect of country using dummy variables is problematic, as several countries have no 
or very little variation in number of parties or in cabinet type (single party or coalition). 
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critical junior parties are more cooperative, less extreme, and less committed in their 
behaviors than coalitions without critical junior parties. The presence of critical junior 
parties does not appear to promote more extreme foreign policy for coalition 
governments, as we hypothesized. These results suggest that such parties do not 
blackmail, hijack, or polarize through persuasion to push the cabinet toward highly 
extreme and committed behaviors, but instead may act as moderating forces. In addition, 
although we made no prediction on the cooperative-conflictual direction of critical 
junior parties’ influence, their presence in a coalition correlates with more cooperative 
behavior. These results are consistent with the democratic peace research, as multiple 
actors are expected to constrain governments to cooperate.   
-- TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE -- 
Parliamentary strength is also significantly related to cooperation/conflict, 
extremity, and commitment in these data. Two of the relationships are in the direction we 
hypothesized. Foreign policy behavior becomes more conflictual as parliamentary 
strength declines: the weaker the coalition (as measured by parliamentary strength), the 
more conflictual the behavior. Similarly, foreign policy behavior becomes more extreme 
when coalition governments hold proportionally fewer seats in their parliaments. Both of 
these findings are consistent with the diversionary argument: weakness prompts 
behaviors designed to bolster legitimacy and to redirect attention from political fragility. 
Interestingly, weakness as measured by the majority/minority status is not significantly 
related to levels of cooperation or extremity for coalitions. This may suggest an 
important but independent role for parliamentary strength in coalitions’ foreign policy 
extremity. Our analysis does not support the notion that minority coalitions are 
particularly vulnerable and thus prone to diversionary behaviors. Rather, the overall 
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level of parliamentary support may be the more important consideration with regard to 
the weakness of a regime and its impact on diversionary behavior. 
Contrary to our expectation, however, stronger coalitions are more committed.  
This is the case for both the parliamentary strength variable and the majority/minority 
status variable. This is puzzling, since we expected parliamentary strength to act 
similarly for extremity and commitment; we predicted stronger coalitions to be more 
extreme and more committed. Furthermore, extremity and commitment are themselves 
significantly related, but not identical (Pearson r = .59, p<.01), suggesting the possibility 
of an interaction. We examined the commitment data across different levels of 
parliamentary strength and extremity and found a statistically significant interaction. As 
coalitions get stronger, verbal acts are less extreme. For material behaviors, the 
relationship is non-linear: material acts for weaker governments and for very strong 
governments are not as extreme as material acts committed by moderately strong 
coalitions. We observed the same pattern of interactions for different levels of 
cooperation/conflict. Overall, our findings suggest that parliamentary strength is a factor 
in discerning coalitions’ foreign policy behaviors, and thus the diversionary logic may 
be crucial for explaining the more extreme policies of coalitions.  
Our third coalition cabinet characteristic, the number of parties in the coalition, is 
also significantly related to cooperation/conflict. As predicted, coalitions with more 
parties are more conflictual. Our results with regard to number of parties, however, do 
not support our hypotheses regarding extremity and commitment. These results are 
consistent with the diffusion of accountability and the logrolling explanations, but only 
with regard to conflictual behavior. More parties in the cabinet may take riskier and 
more conflictual decisions because they feel they are less responsible for any policy 
failures. Alternatively, more parties may engage in logrolling many of their own 
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interests, and conflictual policies that benefit each party’s narrow interests might not be 
checked by a general, diffuse interest.   
 
Single Parties and Coalitions: Results & Discussion 
The characteristics of coalitions shed considerable light on their extreme 
behavior, but the pattern of our results was unexpected in many ways. Three of these 
characteristics – parliamentary strength, majority/minority status, and number of parties 
– can be analyzed for single-party governments as well.19  This provides a sharper 
picture of the distinguishing characteristics of single-party and coalition decision units. 
We proceed with the same data based on the same sources, operational definitions, 
relevant control variables, and procedures for weighting. The first analysis (Model 1 in 
Table 4) combines all cabinets and examines the effects of cabinet type (single-party or 
coalition), parliamentary strength, and majority/minority status.20 The number of parties 
variable cannot be included in this analysis, due to the very high correlation between 
cabinet type and number of parties (Pearson r = .8, p<.001). Hence we include it in a 
separate analysis (Model 4).     
--TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE-- 
Cabinet type is significantly related to cooperation/conflict and extremity, with 
coalitions behaving more cooperatively and more extremely than single-party cabinets. 
These results replicate our earlier findings (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008). As with the 
analysis of coalitions alone, we find that parliamentary strength is significantly related to 
cooperation/conflict, extremity, and commitment. Contrary to the coalitions-only 
                                                
19 The presence of critical junior parties cannot apply to single party cabinets since, by definition, they do 
not include any junior parties.  This variable is thus not included in any subsequent analyses. 
20 Parliamentary support and majority/minority status are positively correlated (Pearson r=.537).  We 
utilize Variance-Inflation Factor (VIF) to determine possible problems with co-linearity.  All VIF values 
were below 2.0 in all main-effects models and below 8.0 in models with interaction terms, thus indicating 
no co-linearity concerns (Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price 2000). 
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analysis, however, these results show that stronger cabinets are more conflictual and 
more extreme. Similar to the coalitions-only results, however, stronger cabinets are more 
committed in their behaviors. Majority/minority status (our other indicator of weakness) 
is not significantly related to cooperation/conflict, but is significantly related to 
commitment in the same direction as parliamentary strength. Majority/minority status is 
related to extremity in this analysis, although at a low threshold of statistical significance 
(p<.1) and in the opposite direction of parliamentary strength. Therefore, majority 
cabinets are more cooperative than minority cabinets in this analysis. 
Although these starkly different findings in the second analysis could be 
attributed to the structure of their respective statistical models (i.e., the second analysis 
excludes critical junior parties and the number of parties), we note that a more likely 
explanation lies in the interaction between parliamentary strength and cabinet type. 
Model 2 in Table 4 presents the results of the regression analyses with the interaction of 
cabinet type and parliamentary strength. The interaction is indeed significant: 
parliamentary strength has a different relationship with both cooperation/conflict and 
extremity depending on whether the cabinet was a coalition or a single party. This 
pattern of results also holds for the interaction between majority/minority status and 
cabinet type, as presented in Model 3 in Table 4.   
Separate linear regressions for single party governments and coalitions confirm 
the nature of the interaction. For single party governments, parliamentary strength is 
negatively related to cooperation (unstandardized coefficient = -1.633 (.752); p<.05) and 
positively related to extremity (2.502 (.392); p<.01), whereas the results are opposite for 
coalitions (cooperation/conflict: 2.043 (.439), p<.01; extremity: -.897 (.231), p<.01).  
For coalitions, majority/minority status is unrelated to both cooperation/conflict (.070 
(.134), ns) and extremity (.024 (.072), ns), but for single parties, majorities are more 
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conflictual (-.360 (.132), p<.01) but less extreme (-.380 (.071), p<.01) than minorities.  
In sum, the effect of weakness on cooperation/conflict and extremity is different for 
single-party governments than for coalitions. Weakness (as measured by parliamentary 
strength) results in less extreme and more cooperative behavior in single-party 
governments, but more extreme and more conflictual behavior in coalitions. Weakness 
in the form of a minority government results in more conflictual but less extreme 
behavior for single-party governments, and has no effect on coalitions.21 
These results suggest that government weakness, as measured by parliamentary 
strength, operates very differently for single-party and multi-party cabinets. Single-party 
governments with weaker parliamentary support may be less confident, less willing to 
take risks, and less able to mobilize resources, pushing them to engage in less extreme 
and aggressive behaviors. Conversely, coalitions with weaker parliamentary support 
may seek to divert attention from their relatively vulnerable position by engaging in 
more aggressive and extreme behaviors. If so, the diversionary logic applies only to 
coalition governments and not to single-party governments.   
The other cabinet characteristic we examine is the number of parties in the 
government across both single-party and coalition governments. Model 4 in Table 4 
presents the results of this analysis, again including parliamentary strength and 
majority/minority status (to isolate the effect of number of parties). These results show 
that the number of parties is also a significant predictor of commitment and extremity. 
The presence of more parties increases the probability of high-commitment foreign 
policies. Similarly, as the number of parties increases, there is an associated increase in 
                                                
21 Unfortunately, running an interaction for majority/minority status and parliamentary strength is 
statistically problematic, in part due to co-linearity between the two variables as an interaction term, and 
in part due to the uneven distribution of minority governments across both country and coalition/single-
party status.  Running separate regressions for majority and minority governments is also untenable due to 
the small number of events for minority coalitions across several countries.  
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extremity. Thus the number of parties is related in similar ways for extremity and 
commitment, consistent with the diffusion of accountability and logrolling explanations.  
The relationship between the number of parties and cooperation/conflict, 
however, is not significant. Unlike the coalitions-only results, cabinets with more parties 
are not necessarily more conflictual. Because of these different results for the number of 
parties across all cabinets, we examined the shape of the relationships by looking at the 
weighted means.22  Figure 1 shows the non-linear relationship between the number of 
parties and cooperation/conflict (unadjusted weighted means). Coalitions with two 
parties are more cooperative than single party governments, but three- and four-party 
coalitions are more conflictual, and five-party coalitions look similar to two-party 
coalitions in their level of cooperation/conflict. Figure 2 shows a non-linear relationship 
between the number of parties and extremity (unadjusted weighted means). Cabinets 
with three and four parties are more extreme, on average, than one and two party 
cabinets; five party cabinets are the most moderate, on average. Overall, this indicates 
that different logics may be operating for different types of cabinets. These patterns also 
suggest that the difference between single-party cabinets and coalitions is not a 
dichotomous distinction (either single-party or multi-party), but rather that differences 
are being driven by larger coalitions and that single-party and two-party cabinets may be 
more similar than different. Brulé and Williams (2009) present similar results, finding 
that governments with one and two parties have the opposite effect on diversionary 
behavior than governments with three or more parties. 
 
--FIGURES 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE -- 
 
                                                
22 An analysis for interaction between number of parties and cabinet type is not possible, since all cabinets 
with 1 party are also single-party cabinets. 
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Conclusion 
The results of this study (summarized in Table 5) offer compelling insights into 
the institutional characteristics that distinguish the foreign policy behaviors of coalition 
and single-party governments. All three characteristics examined in this study – the 
presence of a critical junior party, parliamentary strength, and number of parties in the 
cabinet –predict various aspects of these countries’ foreign policy behaviors. Countries 
ruled by coalitions with weak parliamentary support behave differently than those ruled 
by coalitions with strong support. Coalitions with fewer parties will likely behave 
differently than those with many coalition partners. Coalitions with critical junior parties 
act differently than those without. Importantly, by examining extremity, we isolate the 
institutional and psychological effects of coalitions on foreign policy independent of 
actors’ policy positions. Even without knowing the content of a policy (i.e., whether it is 
cooperative or conflictual), our results show that cabinet characteristics influence the 
foreign policy of parliamentary democracies. This could explain the mixed results of 
previous research on the relationship between institutional characteristics and conflict 
behavior.    
-- TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE -- 
These findings challenge the logic of how institutions affect democratic peace.  
Institutional constraints that presumably produce peaceful behavior, such as multiple 
voices in a cabinet, are actually related to more conflictual behavior in our study. The 
number of potential veto-players in a coalition also does not correlate with foreign 
policy in the direction that democratic peace theory predicts: in coalitions, more parties 
are associated with more conflictual and committed behaviors. The presence of a critical 
junior party, on the other hand, does seem to constrain coalitions towards more 
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cooperative behaviors. Institutional and psychological dynamics appear to be operating 
within coalitions that distinguish these types of governments from single-party cabinets.   
In particular, our results suggest that coalitions with weak parliamentary support 
engage in diversionary tactics, whereas similarly weak single-party cabinets do not. 
Since our study does not include measures of domestic conditions that could motivate 
diversionary foreign policy, we can only speculate on this observed relationship. The 
traditional logic states that coalitions are more politically vulnerable than single-party 
governments. Weak parliamentary support is then a “compounded weakness”, 
compelling coalitions to divert domestic attention by engaging in higher-profile foreign 
policy behavior. Single-party governments, on the other hand, do not experience this 
additional level of structural weakness. This can explain why majority/minority status 
had no independent effect on coalitions for cooperation/conflict or extremity in our 
analyses. Perhaps minority status could not amplify the “compounded weakness” of 
coalition governments further, as even a relatively strong minority government has 
rather weak parliamentary support (50% or less). Unfortunately, the difficulty of 
examining the interaction between majority/minority status and parliamentary strength 
limited our ability to investigate this with our data. Nevertheless, the observed 
interactions are intriguing, suggesting that different mechanisms may be at work.      
More research is also needed to clarify and verify the apparent non-linear 
relationship between number of parties and foreign policy behaviors. In our analysis, the 
difference between one- and two-party cabinets and three- and four-party cabinets is 
unclear, and there is no obvious theoretical rationale to explain this difference. 
Psychological research has encountered a similar puzzle.  A recent review of research on 
the effects of diversity on work groups suggests that there may be curvilinear 
relationships between diversity and work performance—i.e., only moderate diversity 
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produces greater performance—but the reasons for this relationship require additional 
investigation (van Knippenberg and Schippers 2007).  
 In investigations into the foundations of democratic peace, scholars have 
attempted to isolate the normative, social, and institutional aspects of democracies that 
pacify their international behavior. There is now growing empirical consensus that the 
institutional features of coalition governments systematically influence their foreign 
policies. By dissecting these dynamics, our study offers additional insight into the 
political and social psychological mechanisms by which institutional characteristics can 
(or cannot) constrain foreign policy.  
This study moves the research on institutional effects closer to the decision-
making process by identifying cabinet characteristics that highlight both political and 
psychological explanations of extreme foreign policy. Decision-making dynamics in 
cabinets are foundational to these explanations.  These aggregate analyses, however, 
cannot examine the exact decision making mechanisms at work. For example, although 
our results suggest that diversionary tactics can explain the more extreme behavior of 
coalitions, we do not have direct evidence that this dynamic actually creates the 
extremity. We are also unable to distinguish the logrolling explanation from the 
diffusion of accountability explanation with these data.   
  We need to know much more about how coalitions choose particular foreign 
policies to understand the dynamics that various cabinet characteristics produce. A case 
study approach that traces the process of decision-making in cabinet governments may 
be the best strategy for further investigation.  We also need to know more about the 
decision-making process to understand the relative importance of institutional and 
psychological factors.   
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Coalition are distinct from other forms of government in many ways, but the 
prevailing view of them as misfits prone to limitations imposed by instability and 
deadlock belies their complex dynamics and the important foreign policies they 
generate.   Conflating institutional complexities with excessive constraints neglects the 
stories coalitions can tell us about democratic structures and foreign policy decision 
making. This is particularly important, as coalitions appear likely to be an increasingly 
common actor on the international stage.  As Bejar, Mukherjee and Moore (2011) 
observe, coalition governments are growing in frequency around the world and are now 
the most common form of government. Understanding the dynamics shaping their 
creation and conduct of foreign policy is of central concern. 
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Table 1.  Explanations of Extreme Foreign Policy in Coalitions 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Hypothesis     Underlying Mechanism 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
The presence of a critical junior party  blackmail by extreme junior parties; 
will result in more extreme and  persuasion by assertive members 
committed  behaviors 
   
Weaker coalitions will engage in more diversion and stress from domestic 
extreme, committed, and conflictual   weakness and uncertainty 
behaviors 
    
More political parties within coalitions diffusion of accountability 
 will result in more extreme,    and responsibility; 
committed, and conflictual behaviors  logrolling  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2. Countries and Cabinet Types, 1966-1989 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
     # of Events  # of Events    
    With Single  with Coalition  
  Actor  Party Cabinets Cabinets  Total 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Australia  281     286     567 
Austria  192       48     240 
Belgium         0     289     289 
Canada           1158         0      1158 
Denmark    93       73     166 
West Germany   14   2907   2921 
Greece   547         0     547 
Iceland      0     137     137 
India            1759         0   1759 
Ireland   176     109     285 
Israel       0   6526   6526 
Italy   105     799     904 
Japan             1674                171   1845 
Luxembourg       0       38       38 
Netherlands       0     317     317 
New Zealand   271         0     271 
Norway   101     104     205 
Spain   256         0     256 
Sweden   326       45     371 
Turkey    332     408     740 
United Kingdom        3896         0   3896 
 
Total          11,181 (48%) 12,257 (52%)            23,438 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3. Coalition Cabinet Characteristics and Foreign Policy Behavior 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
     
Cooperation/Conflict Extremity  Commitment 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Critical Junior Party  1.345 (.155)***  -0.395 (.081)*** -0.386 (..085)*** 
 
Parliamentary Strength  2.557 (.440)***  -1.014 (.232)***  0.960 (.242)*** 
 
Majority Government  0.096 (.134)  0.002 (.072)  0.302 (.076)*** 
 
Number of Coalition Parties      -0.138 (.043)***   0.004 (.023)  0.034 (.025) 
  
Actor Power   56.432 (3.554)*** -23.943 (1.891)*** -27.096 (2.276)*** 
 
Democratic Target  0.533  (.080)*** -----------------  -------------- 
 
(Constant)   -3.284 (.315)*** 3.873 (.164)***  -1.464 (.194)*** 
 
N    8849   12,257   12,257 
  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
(Notes:  Critical Junior Party is a dichotomous variable (1=there was a critical party; 
0=none of the junior parties were critical).  Majority Government is a dichotomous 
variable (0=minority government; 1=majority government). The number of events for the 
cooperation/conflict analysis is lower due to the exclusion of events with non-state actor 
targets.  Reported here are the unstandardized coefficients from the regression analysis, 
with two-tailed tests (logit analysis for the commitment variable).  Numbers in 
parentheses are the standard errors.  Asterisks indicate significance levels:  ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10). 
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Table 5.  Unpacking the Distinctiveness of Coalitions:  Summary of Key Findings 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Cabinet Characteristic Foreign Policy Underlying Logic 
_______________________________________________________________________
   
Critical Junior Parties  Cooperative,   Democratic Peace 
in Coalitions   Moderate, 
    Low Commitment 
      
Parliamentary Strength 
 Weaker Coalitions Conflictual,   Diversionary 
    Extreme    
 
 Stronger  Conflictual,  Resources/Support/ 
 Single Party  Extreme,  Confidence 
    Committed   
  
Number of Parties 
More Parties  Conflictual,  Diffusion of     
In Coalitions  Committed  Accountability/ 
       Logrolling 
 
More Parties  Non-Linear   Different Logics 
Across Cabinets Relationships  Operative for 1- & 2 -vs. 
       3- & 4-party Cabinets 
   
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
